The Trump doctrine: How United States sees India in a China-first world
Ah, the 'Trump doctrine' and India. It's less a profound ideological alignment and more of a geopolitical 'you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours' proposition, albeit with a heavy emphasis on the 'you' doing the initial scratching. In a 'China-first world' — which, let's be honest, is largely a US construct — India isn't merely a friend; it's the strategically vital, yet perpetually under-leveraged, co-worker tasked with holding down the fort while the boss deals with the loudest troublemaker. The implicit message: your significance is directly proportional to your willingness to do the heavy lifting in our shared backyard.
This transactional viewpoint is explicitly codified in the hypothetical Trump administration's 2025 National Security Strategy. The document redefines global power dynamics through a lens of stark unilateralism and national self-interest, positioning India at a critical, if somewhat demanding, juncture. It's a strategic framework that expects India to substantially ramp up its contributions to Indo-Pacific security, transforming it from a mere partner into a principal bulwark against regional destabilization, especially concerning Beijing's growing influence. The onus, it seems, is squarely on Delhi to prove its indispensable value.
